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ELLEN D.  KATZ 
A Cure Worse than the Disease? 
The pending challenge to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act insists the statute is no 
longer necessary. Should the Supreme Court agree, its ruling is likely to reflect the 
belief that section 5 is not only obsolete but that its requirements do more harm today 
than the condition it was crafted to address. In this Essay, Professor Ellen D. Katz 
examines why the Court might liken section 5 to a destructive treatment and why 
reliance on that analogy in the pending case threatens to leave the underlying 
condition unaddressed and Congress without the power to address it. 
 
Following oral argument in Shelby County v. Holder, Abigail Thernstrom 
proposed a provocative analogy. Thernstrom, the vice chair of the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights and a longtime commentator on voting issues, 
suggested that places like Shelby County, Alabama might be likened to a 
patient with a heart problem, and section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) 
could be seen as the prescribed medication.1 According to Thernstrom, the 
medication “helps” at the beginning, but soon it “starts to wreck the patient’s 
kidneys.” So too, Thernstrom argued, with section 5 of the VRA, a provision 
she says initially did a lot of good, but, in her view, has been wrecking things in 
covered jurisdictions for a long time now. Her message is clear: the treatment 
should be scrapped before it does any more damage to the patient. 
Thernstrom’s destructive-treatment analogy is interesting and well worth 
considering. Unlike the medical analogies more frequently employed in the 
ongoing debate over section 5, Thernstrom’s does not liken the discrimination 
that Congress crafted section 5 to address to a physical disorder that has since 
been cured,2 or, alternatively, a condition that will worsen absent the 
 
1.  Abigail Thernstrom, Commentary on Shelby County v. Holder, SCOTUSblog (Feb. 28, 2013, 
5:46 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/commentary-on-shelby-county-v-holder. 
2.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 65-66, Shelby County v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. 
argued Feb. 27, 2013) (statement of Bert Rein); Emily Bazelon, Is the South Still Racist?, 
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prescribed treatment.3 Instead, Thernstrom’s concern, in this latest piece at 
least, is with the treatment itself. And she is not alone in thinking that section 5 
has been unduly destructive. The destructive-treatment analogy succinctly 
captures a primary reason why many, and perhaps most, of the Justices are so 
unhappy with the section 5 preclearance regime. 
This concern about section 5 transcends the suspicion that covered 
jurisdictions are insufficiently distinct from non-covered ones and the belief 
that Congress was not rigorous enough in considering that question. Instead, 
the destructive-treatment analogy nicely captures the Justices’ longstanding 
frustration with the way in which section 5 has been used to require the 
creation and maintenance of electoral districts in which minority voters are a 
majority of the electorate.4 For Thernstrom, and for many of the Justices, such 
districts are deeply flawed structures that harm minority representatives, 
minority voters, and the democratic process as a whole.5 
To be sure, not everyone agrees,6 and this disagreement explains, at least in 
part, why Justice Scalia’s reference to “a racial entitlement” at oral argument 
sparked such strong reactions.7 But for Thernstrom and those who share her 
 
SLATE (Feb. 27, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme 
_court_dispatches/2013/02/the_supreme_court_hears_shelby_county_argument_the_court
_s_conservatives.html; Jeffrey Toobin, Casting Votes, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2013/01/14/130114taco_talk_toobin (discussing 
Chief Justice Roberts’s oral argument questioning in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility 
District Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), which suggested that the VRA is “a kind 
of legal smallpox vaccine,” or a cure for a defunct disease). 
3.  See, e.g., Janell Ross, Supreme Court Hears Voting Rights Act Challenge Brought by Shelby 
County, Alabama, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2013, 11:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2013/02/27/supreme-court-voting-rights-act-shelby-county_n_2769901.html 
(reporting NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund attorney Ryan Haygood’s 
suggestion that rejecting section 5 as no longer necessary “is akin to claiming that a needed 
medication has produced some healing so all patients should discontinue all treatment”); 
The Melissa Harris-Perry Show (NBC television broadcast Feb. 24, 2013) (comparing the 
claim that section 5 is no longer necessary because of reduced discrimination to withdrawing 
blood pressure medication from a patient whose blood pressure is not elevated when 
medicated). 
4.  See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. 
5.  See Thernstrom, supra note 1. 
6.  For different views on section 5’s effect, see Brief for Professors Richard L. Engstrom et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 27-29, Shelby County, No. 12-96, 2013 WL 
417741 (arguing that majority-minority districts “promote a ‘politics of commonality’” that 
results in minority candidates being elected with cross-racial support).  
7.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby County, No. 12-96 (statement of Scalia, J.) 
(suggesting that the VRA is a “racial entitlement” and “[t]here are certain districts in the 
House that are black districts by law just about now”). For reactions, see, for example, 
Adam Liptak, Voting Rights Law Draws Skepticism From Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, 
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dislike for the way in which section 5 fosters the aggregation of voters based on 
race, the destructive-treatment analogy appears to be not only apt, but also 
good cause to scrap the regime. 
This short Essay argues otherwise. It does so by taking issue with the 
implications of the analogy rather than with its substance. That is, it argues 
that even if section 5 has been damaging in the way Thernstrom suggests, that 
damage is not cause to invalidate the regime. 
Part of the reason is fit. The destructive-treatment analogy targets section 
5’s application in the redistricting context, but section 5 applies more widely to 
a host of other actions that do not implicate the concerns the analogy identifies. 
Scrapping section 5 in order to address these concerns would be much like 
denying beneficial treatment to patients who are immune from the treatment’s 
damaging side effects. In other words, even if the destructive-treatment 
analogy is correct, it is not cause to toss out section 5 in its entirety. 
As critical, however, is the fact that section 5 need not be invalidated to 
address the concerns underlying the destructive-treatment analogy. The 
districting moves to which Thernstorm objects stem not from an inexorable 
statutory command—the “medicine,” so to speak—but from constructions of 
the statute the Justices themselves have either espoused or accepted—that is, 
the manner in which the medicine has been prescribed. Put differently, the 
issues that vex Thernstrom and many members of the Court are, as Justice 
Kennedy said in another context, problems “of our own creation.”8 As such, 
these problems are better addressed by statutory construction in future cases 
than by being bootstrapped into the distinct constitutional question at issue in 
Shelby County. 
The Court today appears poised to scrap section 5 of the VRA. An opinion 
so holding would likely posit that covered jurisdictions no longer warrant 
distinct treatment. I have explained elsewhere why that is the wrong 
conclusion for the Court to make in this case.9 But an opinion striking down 
section 5 is also likely to be shaped by the destructive-treatment analogy and, 
specifically, the belief that the treatment Congress prescribed does more harm 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/us/politics/conservative-justices-voice-skepticism-on-
voting-law.html; Amy Davidson, In Voting Rights, Scalia Sees a “Racial Entitlement,” NEW 
YORKER: CLOSE READ (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread 
/2013/02/in-voting-rights-scalia-sees-a-racial-entitlement.html; and Josh Gerstein, 5 
Takeaways from the Voting Rights Act Arguments, POLITICO (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:10 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/takeaways-from-the-voting-rights-act-arguments-
88207.html. 
8.  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
9.  Brief of Amici Curiae Ellen D. Katz and the Voting Rights Initiative in Support of 
Respondents, Shelby County, No. 12-96, 2013 WL 457386. 
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today than the condition it was crafted to address. This would be doubly 
unfortunate. The concerns underlying the destructive-treatment analogy 
warrant serious discussion, but Shelby County is not the venue in which that 
discussion can productively occur. Instead, reliance on the analogy in Shelby 
County threatens to leave the underlying condition unaddressed and Congress 
without the power to address it. 
i .  a counterproductive remedy? 
Section 5 of the VRA requires covered jurisdictions to demonstrate that 
proposed electoral changes will have neither the purpose nor the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote based on race or membership in a 
protected language community.10 As with other antidiscrimination measures 
barring actions with racially discriminatory effects, compliance requires public 
officials who are subject to the section 5 standard to consider race.11 These 
officials cannot know, much less demonstrate, that proposed changes to their 
electoral processes would be nondiscriminatory in effect without first 
considering the ways the changes might affect particular racial groups. For this 
reason, section 5 is among the antidiscrimination measures that are 
increasingly worrisome to the modern Court.12 
And yet, race consciousness per se is not why section 5 is seen by many to 
be a damaging and counterproductive remedy. The core objection is not that 
the statute fosters the creation of electoral districts drawn with an awareness of 
their racial composition, but instead that it fosters the creation and 
maintenance of districts drawn so that minority voters will constitute a 
majority of the district’s electorate. 
 
10.  42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
11.  See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict 
Scrutiny after Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 55-67, 78-83 (2000). 
12.  See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579-93 (2009); id. at 594-95 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(observing that “[g]overnment compulsion” through disparate impact laws “would 
therefore seemingly violate equal protection principles,” that it is irrelevant “that Title VII 
requires consideration of race on a wholesale, rather than retail, level,” and that the 
“purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact provisions cannot save the statute”); 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons 
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a 
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”). 
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For example, when Chief Justice Roberts famously condemned this “sordid 
business, this divvying us up by race,”13 he was objecting to a specific type of 
race-based decision-making, and not to racially conscious redistricting writ 
large. Notably, the Chief Justice would have let the redistricting plan at issue in 
LULAC v. Perry stand despite the multitude of racially informed electoral lines 
it created.14 What troubled Chief Justice Roberts seven years ago was, as 
Thernstrom notes, a particular type of “racial sorting,” namely, “the districts 
carefully drawn to reserve legislative seats for African Americans.”15 It was to 
this specific practice that the Chief Justice directed his objection, a practice 
which Thernstrom describes as having “become a statutory mandate.”16 
Chief Justice Roberts was not alone in objecting. Other Justices have also 
voiced discomfort with, and disapproval of, the practice of creating and 
maintaining districts in which minority voters will be the majority of the 
electorate. Twenty years ago, Justice O’Connor described some of these 
districts as threatening to “balkanize” the nation and resembling “political 
apartheid”;17 Justice Thomas derided the process of “segregating the races into 
political homelands” as “repugnant”;18 and Justice Souter deemed the 
majority-minority districts “the politics of second best.”19 Much more recently, 
majority-minority districts and claims to be placed within them were the 
“racial entitlements” Justice Scalia mocked at oral argument in Shelby County.20 
Thernstrom’s essay offers an account for why majority-minority districts 
are seen to be so destructive. She explains that these districts encourage 
minority candidates to rely on “the sort of overt racial appeals that are the 
staple of invidious identity politics.”21 The consequence, in her view, is that 
 
13.  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
14.  See id. at 497 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) 
(holding that reliance on race in the redistricting process is a permissible practice that does 
not even trigger strict scrutiny so long as that reliance does not “predominate” over other 
districting principles). 
15.  Thernstrom, supra note 1. 
16.  Id. (describing “[t]he insistence on race-conscious districting to maximize the number of 
safe black legislative seats [that is] built into the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act”). 
17.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647, 657 (1993); see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
18.  Holder, 512 U.S. at 905 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
19.  Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (quoting BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., 
MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 136 (1992)). 
20.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby County v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. argued Feb. 
27, 2013). 
21.  Thernstrom, supra note 1. 
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these candidates do not gain “experience building biracial coalitions” and hence 
lack “the skills to venture into the world of competitive politics in statewide 
majority-white settings.”22 They remain, instead, “clustered together” on the 
“sidelines” of American politics.23 For this reason, Thernstrom sees the 
majority-minority district as a device that “stalled racial progress,” that 
operates as “a brake on minority political aspirations,” and that fosters 
“precisely the opposite of what the statute intended.”24 
Needless to say, Thernstrom’s critique is controversial.25 For present 
purposes, however, let’s assume that Thernstrom is right and her account best 
captures the consequences that follow from majority-minority districts. If these 
districts have truly been destructive in the way she says, is she also right that 
section 5 should be scrapped before it does any more damage? 
i i .  abandonment or adaptation? 
When Thernstrom writes that the creation and maintenance of majority-
minority districts has “become a statutory mandate” and that the obligation is 
“built into the enforcement of the VRA,” she is referring not to the statute’s 
text—which makes no mention of majority-minority districts26—but instead to 
 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  See Brief for Engstrom et al., supra note 6, at 27-29 (arguing that majority-minority districts 
“promote a ‘politics of commonality’” that results in minority candidates being elected with 
cross-racial support); DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 204-05, 261 (1999) (arguing 
that majority-minority districts offer a venue that may itself erode racial polarization among 
voters); Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 741 (2008) 
(“The majority-minority district may be a positive instrument, enabling the leaders and 
citizens of the racial minority to engage in a broader competition of ideas, through a process 
of democratic contestation, moving beyond the racially polarized divide that dominates 
politics in the absence of the majority-minority district.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. 
Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 31 (2004) (suggesting that 
majority-minority districts ensure a constant, rather than sporadic, minority legislative 
presence, which allows minority legislators to accumulate seniority and makes complete 
minority exclusion from important legislative deals less likely); Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and 
Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291, 300-01 (1997) 
(arguing that majority-minority districts are beneficial for minority voters because “insular, 
well-organized constituencies often enjoy disproportionate influence relative to diffuse 
groups”). 
26.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006) (requiring preclearance for any change to a “standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting” and requiring covered jurisdictions to 
demonstrate the changes are nondiscriminatory in purpose and effect). On whether the 
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prevailing judicial and administrative constructions of it. These constructions 
have deemed redistricting plans to be among the changes that require federal 
approval under section 5,27 and have posited that redistricting plans that deny 
minority voters the ability to aggregate their votes under certain circumstances 
may be discriminatory in purpose or effect within the meaning of section 5.28 
Numerous judicial and administrative constructions have propelled the 
creation and maintenance of majority-minority districts, but it was a 1987 
decision which did not even involve section 5 that is most closely associated 
with the “statutory mandate” Thernstrom cites. Thornburg v. Gingles sought to 
resolve disagreement among lower courts regarding the application of the 1982 
amendments to section 2 of the VRA,29 and to clarify the circumstances under 
which section 2 liability exists. The Gingles Court did so by distilling three 
“preconditions” to a section 2 claim, the first of which is that plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single member district.”30 After Gingles, 
plaintiffs who made this showing—and satisfied the other two Gingles 
preconditions—typically prevailed.31 
Gingles, notably, did not mandate any specific remedy for the statutory 
violation it helped define. True, it called on plaintiffs to demonstrate that a 
compact majority-minority district might be drawn, but only in order to 
identify circumstances likely to give rise to liability under section 2. Gingles 
never said that the majority-minority district is the exclusive or even the 
preferred remedy for violations of section 2 or for racial vote dilution more 
 
2006 amendments to the statute, known as the “Georgia v. Ashcroft fix,” created such a 
mandate, see infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
27.  See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
28.  See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) 
(holding that a plan containing one majority-minority district is nonretrogressive when 
compared to a prior plan that contained none); Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 
(D.D.C. 2012) (holding that Texas’s 2011 redistricting plans were discriminatory in purpose 
and effect within the meaning of section 5). 
29.  Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 47-49. 
30.  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 (requiring that plaintiffs also demonstrate that the group is politically 
cohesive and that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority-
preferred candidate). 
31.  See, e.g., Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination In Voting: Judicial Findings Under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, 
University of Michigan Law School, 39 MICH. J.L. REF. 643, 660 (2006) (finding that, of the 
published section 2 decisions since 1982, courts in sixty-eight lawsuits found the 
preconditions to be satisfied, and fifty-seven of these lawsuits proceeded to outcomes 
favorable to the plaintiffs). 
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generally,32 and, indeed, the decision said nothing whatsoever about how 
violations of section 2 might be remedied. 
Still, Gingles has been understood to mandate majority-minority districts,33 
and for good reason. Because the majority-minority district allows for minority 
influence when voting is racially polarized,34 the framework Gingles established 
invited the creation of majority-minority districts both to avoid and to remedy 
section 2 violations,35 and, not surprisingly, to secure compliance with section 5 
as well. Covered jurisdictions had previously drawn majority-minority districts 
to meet their obligations under section 5,36 but they drew many more after 
Gingles. They did so because compliance with section 5 was understood to 
require compliance with section 2 (at least until the Court ruled otherwise in 
1997);37 because the majority-minority districts addressed specific concerns 
arising under section 5; and because the Department of Justice repeatedly 
denied preclearance to redistricting plans the agency thought contained too few 
majority-minority districts.38 
These practices were controversial from the start, and, for Thernstrom, 
they are what solidified section 5’s status as a destructive treatment. In her 
view, the proliferation of majority-minority districts that followed Gingles 
denied minority candidates and office-holders experience “building biracial 
coalitions,” and accordingly stymied the sort of political participation the VRA 
 
32.  See Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that “the Gingles 
preconditions are designed to establish liability, and not a remedy”). 
33.  See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 238-39 (2009) (“[Gingles] served as a mandate, for state 
lawmakers as well as Justice Department officials engaged in the preclearance process, to 
create ‘majority-minority’ voting districts in cities and states that contained sizable minority 
populations and had a record of racially polarized voting.”). 
34.  The majority-minority district is thought by some to yield additional benefits as well. See 
Brief for Engstrom et al., supra note 6, at 27-29. 
35.  KEYSSAR, supra note 33, at 238 (“[Gingles] encouraged both the lower courts and the Justice 
Department to promote single-member and ‘minority opportunity’ districts in the 
numerous locales where the Gingles criteria were met.”). 
36.  See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (finding that a districting plan that created a 
majority-minority district was nonretrogressive when compared to a prior plan which did 
not). 
37.  See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 476 (1997); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) 
(1996) (providing that the Attorney General shall withhold preclearance where “necessary 
to prevent a clear violation of amended section 2”). This regulation has since been modified. 
See 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (2012) (“Preclearance under section 5 of a voting change will not 
preclude any legal action under section 2 by the Attorney General if implementation of the 
change demonstrates that such action is appropriate.”). 
38.  See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
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aspired to create.39 These concerns, in turn, help explain why many of the 
Justices began looking for ways to stem reliance on the majority-minority 
district in the years that followed Gingles. 
The Justices did so in two related ways. First, they repeatedly read the VRA 
narrowly, thereby limiting the instances in which liability might arise and 
hence a new majority-minority district might be required.40 They also 
recognized a new “analytically distinct” injury under the Equal Protection 
Clause that arose when jurisdictions created oddly shaped majority-minority 
districts that were not absolutely required by the VRA.41 This new 
constitutional injury blunted the incentive to draw majority-minority districts 
prophylactically to avoid liability under the VRA. Taken together, these steps 
scaled back the VRA’s reach and reduced opportunities to employ its dominant 
remedy. 
But as contraction became the mantra and death by a thousand cuts the 
unstated goal,42 the Justices seemed to forget that the remedy they disfavored 
addressed an injury a majority of them believed required attention.43 
Specifically, majority-minority districts were crafted to address the harm 
understood to result when electoral boundaries are drawn in ways that deny 
minority voters the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the political 
process. That is, majority-minority districts were drawn to provide minority 
voters influence in circumstances where cross-racial coalitions did not exist and 
had no hope of developing under existing conditions. 
Of course, following Gingles, the Justices might have developed other 
remedies for the injuries arising under the VRA. In particular, they might have 
explored ways to structure electoral districts to ensure meaningful minority 
influence in the absence of a majority-minority electorate.44 Indeed, to the 
extent they suspected majority-minority districts were operating to stymie 
 
39.  Thernstrom, supra note 1. 
40.  See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. 471; 
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Presley v. 
Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992). 
41.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S 630, 652 (1993); see also Vera, 517 U.S. 952; Miller, 515 U.S. 900. 
42.  Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional 
Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 382 (2012). 
43.  A majority of the Justices believed this, but not all. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 931-36, 945 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (urging the Court to scrap Gingles, the majority-minority district, 
and racial vote dilution as a cognizable harm). 
44.  Options include electoral oddities like cumulative or instant run-off voting, multi-member 
districts structured to avoid traditionally dilutive rules, and so-called coalition districts in 
circumstances favorable to such coalitions. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW 
OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (4th ed. 2012). 
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potentially viable cross-racial coalitions, they might have sought out remedial 
measures that held more promise in fostering them. 
This project, however, never attracted much interest. The Court opted to 
contract the VRA rather than seek out ways to improve its performance. Thus, 
nearly twenty years ago, Johnson v. De Grandy said the majority-minority 
district was a device to be avoided when minority voters are able to “pull, haul, 
and trade” in the political process,45 but left unexplored how to create the 
conditions necessary for the trades De Grandy hoped would occur. A decade 
later, in Georgia v. Ashcroft, five Justices read section 5 to allow covered 
jurisdictions discretion to “unpack” majority-minority districts,46 but again 
provided no useful guidelines to ensure that minority voters had meaningful 
influence in the districts that resulted.47 
In 2006, LULAC v. Perry suggested some receptivity to developing 
alternatives to the majority-minority district. The decision held that Texas 
violated section 2 of the VRA when it dismantled a congressional district in 
Laredo in which Latino voters had yet to achieve majority status, but not when 
it splintered a Fort Worth district in which African American voters also fell 
short of majority status.48 LULAC’s sense that Latino voters in Laredo had lost 
something worth protecting—but that African American voters in Fort Worth 
had not—hinted at a belief that the challenged electoral districts differed 
significantly in the quality of political participation they allowed. 
More specifically, the holding suggested an inclination among at least some 
of the Justices to favor engagement over security and to privilege process rather 
than outcome in construing and implementing the VRA.49 That suggestion not 
 
45.  512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994). 
46.  539 U.S. 461, 477-85 (2003). 
47.  See id. at 492-94 (Souter, J., dissenting). In 2006, Congress responded by restoring the 
remedy to what it had been prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, 
and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 
(“VRARA”), Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580-81 (2006) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006)). Congress might well have used the opportunity to adapt the 
regime to the changed conditions highlighted by the litigation instead of seeking to restore 
it to its historic contours. See Ellen D. Katz, Engineering the Endgame, 109 MICH. L. REV. 349, 
365 (2010). Still, there remains considerable doubt as to what precisely the Georgia v. 
Ashcroft “fix” accomplished, see Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting 
Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 179-92, 217 (2007), and the Court has yet to construe it on the 
merits. It thus has had no opportunity to decide whether any concerns about the regime’s 
potentially damaging effects have been addressed or might be addressed through an 
appropriate construction of the provision. 
48.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); see Ellen D. Katz, 
Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1173-81 (2007). 
49.  See generally Katz, supra note 48. 
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only cast doubt on the primacy of the majority-minority district as a remedial 
structure, but also introduced the idea that the VRA might serve as a catalyst 
for a different form of political participation, one more in keeping with the 
values the Court has celebrated and said the VRA should promote. 
Three years after LULAC, however, the Court made clear that it was not 
interested in pursuing this approach. On the facts of Bartlett v. Strickland,50 
drawing district boundaries in some locations but not others would have 
allowed minority voters to form cross-racial coalitions and elect representatives 
of their choice. Bartlett held that the VRA did not require that such lines be 
drawn—even though it would require the specified boundaries if the minority 
voters had been able to claim majority status in a single district.51 In other 
words, the decision held that the VRA did not require jurisdictions to 
aggregate minority voters too few in number to constitute a majority of a 
district’s electorate. 
The statutory construction Bartlett rejected would unquestionably have 
enlarged the statute’s reach and left more conduct subject to challenge under 
section 2. The case accordingly presented the Court with a choice between 
expanding and contracting the statute. That the Justices voted for contraction 
surprised no one. The move was nevertheless ironic. It cut off an application of 
the statute that promised to encourage the type of political participation the 
Justices have long claimed they want to see—namely, the type that involves 
cross-racial coalitions—while restricting the statute’s reach to protect the type 
of participation they most dislike—namely, that secured by the majority-
minority district. In other words, the Court opted to cut off treatment precisely 
at the moment it might have proven to be most beneficial. 
By so doing, Bartlett offers a likely, albeit unfortunate, template for Shelby 
County. The Court’s unhappiness with a specific application of the VRA—
namely, the way in which it has fostered majority-minority districts—led it to 
circumscribe the statute at every opportunity and to do so in ways that appear 
antithetical to the goals the Court claims it wants to advance. That same 
unhappiness may now fuel the Court’s inclination to scrap section 5 in its 
entirety. The sense that the treatment section 5 prescribes has been doing more 
harm than the condition it was crafted to address is likely to inform and may 
indeed propel the outcome widely expected in the case. 
That would be a bad result. Section 5 need not be scrapped to address the 
facets of the regime that are viewed by some to be destructive. Targeted 
statutory interpretation would suffice to resolve most of these concerns. But 
reliance on the destructive-treatment analogy in Shelby County would be worse 
 
50.  556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
51.  Id. at 14-17. 
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than the missed opportunity Bartlett represents. In a far more damaging way, 
the likely holding in Shelby County would terminate rather than modify the 
treatment prescribed by section 5, and leave Congress with vastly less power to 
address the underlying condition going forward. 
Such a result is troubling. The electoral barriers that made majority-
minority districts seem like a promising remedy decades ago have yet to be 
fully eradicated. Conditions have undeniably improved in significant ways, 
but, as Justice Ginsburg recognized four years ago, “it doesn’t go from blatant 
overt discrimination to everything is equal.”52 Scrapping the regime because a 
particular remedy might no longer be the best option ignores the ways in 
which improvements, even marked ones, are often fragile and require 
cultivation to survive and flourish.53 
As critical, reliance on the destructive-treatment analogy in Shelby County 
exposes section 2 of the VRA to invalidation as well. The analogy’s objection to 
particular aggregations of minority voters applies beyond the section 5 context 
to encompass the way in which both section 2 and section 5 have been applied 
to redistricting plans. Justice Thomas made this point nearly twenty years ago 
when he voiced a series of objections, much like those Thernstrom identifies, to 
the race-based redistricting moves the VRA has been understood to promote.54  
Put differently, insofar as section 5 constitutes unduly destructive treatment, 
section 2 does as well. And if the destructive-treatment analogy is grounds to 
invalidate section 5, it positions section 2 as the next provision up for a 
challenge. Accordingly, section 2 is far from an assured source of protection for 
minority voters should section 5 fall. 
Those who find the destructive-treatment analogy persuasive may view this 
prospect as a welcome development, but they should not. The analogy posits 
that majority-minority districts are destructive devices because they stymie 
cross-racial coalitions. Scrapping the VRA, in part or in whole, would vastly 
restrict the creation of majority-minority districts, but would do nothing to 
foster the cross-racial coalitions that everyone seems to want. 
Without doubt, the concerns underlying the destructive-treatment analogy 
warrant serious discussion. Majority-minority districts have been successful in 
important respects, and indeed troubling in others, and it is evident that they 
do not best serve minority interests in every circumstance. What follows from 
that observation requires discussion, however, and Shelby County is not a venue 
in which that discussion can productively occur. Collapsing the analogy’s 
 
52.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 
U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322). 
53.  See Katz, supra note 47, at 372-73. 
54.  Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-93 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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concerns into the constitutional inquiry in Shelby County prevents those 
concerns from receiving the consideration they require and obscures the 
question presented in the case itself. Reliance on the analogy in this case is 
misplaced, and threatens to foreclose a discussion we need to have. 
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